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Abstract
The probabilities of joint default among companies are one of the major concerns
in credit risk management, mainly because it aﬀects the distribution of loan portfolio
losses and is therefore critical when allocating capital for solvency purposes. This
paper proposes a multivariate model with time-varying and correlated Sharpe ratios
and volatilities for the value of the ﬁrms, calibrated to ﬁt sample averages between
and within the rating categories A and Ba. We found that, in the standard Merton
framework, the model performs well with one average A-rated ﬁrm and one average
Ba-rated ﬁrm and with two average Ba-rated ﬁrms when the joint default probabilities
are compared with similar empirical probabilities.
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1 Introduction
Modeling dependence between multiple default events are one of the biggest challenges in
credit risk modeling. The most obvious reason is that it aﬀects the distribution of loan
portfolio losses and is therefore critical in determining quantiles or other risk measures used
for allocating capital for solvency purposes. For long term investments, default correlation
can be quite a signiﬁcant factor if the underlying ﬁrm values are highly correlated. Also, a
bank with large loan portfolios can have signiﬁcant exposures to a group of related counter-
parties, i.e. ﬁrms in the same economic sector or geographic region. Thus, they need good
performing models for capturing and forecasting the risks associated with its large portfolios.
Empirical results indicate that conventional methodologies for portfolio default losses that
are typically estimated for meeting bank capital requirements (...) are downward biased by
a full order of magnitude on typical test portfolios (Duﬃe, Eckner, Horel and Saita, 2009).
Also, dependence modeling is necessary in trying to understand the risk of simultaneous
defaults by, for example, ﬁnancial institutions. Standard credit risk models cannot explain
the observed clustering of defaults, which is sometimes described as credit contagion. A
breakdown in the ﬁnancial system could aﬀect the entire economy. Avoiding such breakdowns
are a major motivation behind regulation.
Conventional portfolio loss risk models and default correlations are mainly estimated in two
ways. One method uses historical data and assumes that borrower-level conditional default
probabilities depend on measured ﬁrm-speciﬁc or marketwide factors. Portfolio loss distri-
butions are typically based on the correlating inﬂuence of such observable factors (Duﬃe,
Eckner, Horel and Saita, 2009). The second approach utilizes a particular theoretical struc-
ture of the default process. The most popular structure in practice is based on Merton's
(1974) framework (Zhou, 2001). Moody's KMV approach to measure the default probabil-
ities for diﬀerent ﬁrms, which is based on the Merton's framework, is considered as the best
approach in the industry.
Among others, Chen, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2009) found that a univariate model
for the standard Merton model predicted spreads that falls below historical market spreads
when the model was calibrated to match historical default rates, recovery rates, means and
volatilities. They resolved this credit spread puzzle by the fact that default rates and
Sharpe ratios are strongly correlated; both are high during recessions and low during booms.
Further, they investigated credit spread implications of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
pricing kernel calibrated to equity returns and aggregate consumption data. By identifying
the historical surplus consumption ratio from aggregate consumption data, they found that
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the implied level and time variation of spreads match historical levels well.
Within the lines of Chen, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2009), we propose a multivariate
model with correlated and time-varying means and volatilities, and investigate in a standard
Merton framework its performance with respect to the joint probabilities of default. Using
Monte Carlo simulations, we generate ﬁrm value distributions and investigate how this aﬀects
the joint probabilities of default. Further, we compare these probabilities with empirically
default data from Moody's Investors Service. We also compare the performance of a standard
multivariate model which is a model with constant and independent means and volatilities.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section explains the standard Merton model and
the Moody's KMV approach to measure the default probabilities for diﬀerent ﬁrms. Section
(3) derives the probabilities of joint default and default correlations. Section (4) outlines the
proposed model and Section (5) explains the Monte Carlo analysis, including the calibration
strategy, the Monte Carlo algorithm and the simulation results. In Section (6), we investigate
the risk management implications and compare the model with empirical data. Finally, we
conclude in Section (7).
2
2 The Merton model
2.1 Model overview
The famous framework from Merton (1974) is widely used in credit risk modeling today.
The model employs the general equilibrium theory of option pricing developed by Black &
Scholes in 1973. According to Merton (1974), the value of the corporate debt depends on
three items: the rate of return on the riskless debt (e.g. government bonds that is assumed
to be risk free), the speciﬁcation of the particular issue, i.e. the maturity date, coupon rate,
seniority in the event of default etc., and the probability that the ﬁrm will be unable to
satisfy some or all of the issued claims on the company. This is deﬁned as the probability of
default. The risk free interest rate is thought of as an exogenous variable. Thus, changes in
the value of corporate debt are solely caused by changes in the ﬁrm's probability of default.
The following Black-Scholes assumptions are made to develop the pricing model:
1. There are no transactions costs, taxes, or problems with indivisibilities of assets.
2. There are a suﬃcient number of investors with comparable wealth levels so that each
investor believes that he can buy and sell as much of an asset as he wants at the market
price.
3. There exists an exchange market for borrowing and lending at the same rate of interest.
4. Short-sales of all assets, with full use of the proceeds, is allowed.
5. Trading in assets takes place continuously in time.
6. The Modigliani-Miller theorem that the value of the ﬁrm is invariant to its capital
structure obtains.
7. The term-structure is ﬂat and known with certainty, i.e. the price, P, of a riskless
discount bond which promises a payment of one dollar at time, τ, in the future is
P (τ) = exp(−rτ) where r is the instantaneous annual riskless rate of interest, the
same for all time and exp is the exponential function.
8. The dynamics for the value of the ﬁrm, V, through time can be described by a diﬀusion-
type stochastic process with the stochastic diﬀerential equation
dV = [αV − C] dt+ σV dz, (1)
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where α is the instantaneous expected rate of return on the ﬁrm per unit of time, C is
the total dollar payouts by the ﬁrm per unit of time to either the shareholders or the
liabilities-holders, σ2 is the instantaneous variance of the return on the ﬁrm per unit
of time and dz is a standard Brownian motion.
Suppose there exists a security whose market value, Y, at any point in time can be written as
a function of the value of the ﬁrm and time, i.e. Y = F (V, t). The dynamics of this security's
value is
dY = [αY Y − CY ] dt+ σY Y dzY , (2)
where αY , CY , σ
2
Y and zY have similar interpretations as for the ﬁrm dynamics. From Itô`s
lemma, it follows that the process followed by Y is
dY =
[
∂F
∂V
(αV − C) + ∂F
∂t
+
1
2
∂2F
∂V 2
σ2V 2
]
dt+
∂F
∂V
σV dz. (3)
The terms in the equations (2) and (3) can be compared. Then the following will be true:
αY Y =
∂F
∂V
(αV − C) + ∂F
∂t
+
1
2
∂2F
∂V 2
σ2V 2 + CY (4)
σY Y =
∂F
∂V
σV (5)
dzY = dz (6)
The instantaneous returns on Y and V are perfectly correlated. Following the Merton deriva-
tion of the Black & Scholes model, consider forming a three-security portfolio containing the
ﬁrm, the particular security and the riskless debt. The number of dollar invested in the
ﬁrm, the security and the riskless debt, are W1, W2 and W3, respectively. The portfolio is
constructed such that it requires zero net investments, so W3 ≡ −(W1 + W2). Thus, the
instantaneous return to the portfolio, dx, would be1
dx = [W1(α− r) +W2(αY − r)] dt+ [W1σ +W2σY ] dz. (7)
1See Merton (1973)
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If W1 and W2 are chosen such that dz always will be zero, dx would be non-stochastic. To
avoid arbitrage proﬁts, the expected return on the portfolio must be zero. I.e. the following
two equations must be satisﬁed:
W1σ +W2σY = 0 (8)
W1(α− r) +W2(αY − r) = 0. (9)
A solution to (8) and (9) exists if and only if
(
α− r
σ
) = (
αY − r
σY
). (10)
Substituting from equations (4) and (5) into equation (10) we ﬁnd
(
α− r
σ
) =
∂F
∂V
(αV − C) + ∂F
∂t
+ 1
2
∂2F
∂V 2
σ2V 2 + CY − rF
∂F
∂V
σV
. (11)
Rearranging and simplifying this equation gives
0 =
1
2
∂2F
∂V 2
σ2V 2 + (rV − C)∂F
∂V
− rF + ∂F
∂t
+ CY (12)
Equation (12) is the Black-Scholes-Merton diﬀerential equation. This must be satisﬁed by
any security whose value can be written as a function of the value of the ﬁrm and the
time. The particular derivative that is obtained when the equation is solved depends on
the boundary conditions and initial conditions that are used. It is precisely these boundary
condition speciﬁcations which distinguish one security from another. From equation (12),
there is possible to see that there is only the interest rate, the volatility, the ﬁrm value,
time and the payout policy of the ﬁrm that aﬀect the value of the security. However, it
does not depend on the expected rate of return from the ﬁrm or the risk-preferences of the
investor. Two investors with diﬀerent utility functions would therefore agree on the value of
the security.
In the following, we assume that the company has issued two types of claims: a single, ho-
mogenous class of debt and the residual claim, equity. The bond issue promises to pay D
dollars on a speciﬁed calendar date T. If this payment is not met, the bondholders immedi-
ately take over the company. Two further assumptions are made: the ﬁrm cannot issue any
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new claims on the company nor can it pay cash dividends, so C = 0.With those assumptions,
the payoﬀs to debt, B(T ), and equity, S(T ), at date T are given as
B(T ) = min(D, V (T )) = D −max(D − V (T ), 0), (13)
S(T ) = max(V (T )−D, 0). (14)
As illustrated in Figure (1), in the Merton model the company will default if the ﬁrm value
is less than its liabilities at maturity. If V (T ) < D, then the equity holders receive nothing
and the debt holders get the recovery of V (T ) instead of the promised payment D. But
if the ﬁrm value exceeds the debt, the debt holders receive their promised payment and the
equity holders receive the remaining part of the ﬁrm value. One could see from equation
(13) that the debt can be viewed as the diﬀerence between a riskless bond and a put option
on the ﬁrm's assets and from equation (14) that the equity can be viewed as a call option
on the ﬁrm's assets. Note that in this framework there exist no tax advantages by issuing
debt and no bankruptcy costs. A consequence of this is that at any time t, the relationship
V (t) = B(t) + S(t) should hold.
Figure 1: Default in the Merton model. Source: Giesecke (2004).
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The question is then how the debt and equity are valued prior to the maturity date T. From
the Black-Scholes-Merton diﬀerential equation (12) with the boundary conditions given by
the equations (13) and (14) it can be shown that the following is true:2 Given the current
ﬁrm level V , the volatility σ of the ﬁrm and the riskless rate r, we let CBS(V,D, σ, r, T − t)
denote the Black & Scholes price of an European call option with strike price D and time to
maturity T − t. Then, at time t
CBS(V (t), D, σ, r, T − t) = V Φ(d1)−Dexp [−r(T − t)] Φ(d2) (15)
where Φ(x;µ, σ) ≡ 1
σ
√
2pi
exp
[−1
2
(x−µ
σ
)2
]
is the normal distribution function and
d1 =
log(V/D) + (r + 1
2
σ2)(T − t)
σ
√
T − t , (16)
d2 = d1 − σ
√
T − t. (17)
Similarly, the formula for an European put is
PBS(V (t), D, σ, r, T − t) = Dexp [−r(T − t)] Φ(−d2)− V exp [−r(T − t)] Φ(−d1), (18)
where d1 and d2 are given by the equations (16) and (17), respectively. Thus, the value of
equity and debt at time t are
S(t) = CBS(V (t), D, σ, r, T − t), (19)
B(t) = Dexp [−r(T − t)]− PBS(V (t), D, σ, r, T − t), (20)
respectively. Note that since the sum of debt and equity values is the asset value, we can
also write B(t) = V (t)− CBS(V (t), D, σ, r, T − t).
This basic version of the Merton model was extended in a number of ways. One way was to
assume that the ﬁrm will default whenever the asset value falls below a barrier level. This
is called the Black-Cox Setup. Default can now occur prior to the maturity of the bond
and it will happen when the level of the asset value hits a lower boundary, modeled as a
2See Black and Scholes (1973).
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deterministic function of time. In the original approach of Black and Cox, the boundary
represents the point at which bond safety covenants cause a default. (Black and Cox, 1976).
Another extension of the Merton model was to allow for stochastic default-free interest rates.
This extension was considered due to the empirical evidence which found that the interest
rates on treasury bonds are stochastic. The model was also extended to allow for jumps in
the asset value (Lando, 2004).
2.2 The probability of default in the Merton model
In the basic version of the Merton model, default will occur if the ﬁrm value at time T , V (T ),
is bellow the face value of the debt, D. The model can therefore produce a probability of
default for each ﬁrm in a sample at any given point in time. Bharath and Shumway (2008)
argues that the distance to default can be calculated as
DD =
log(V/D) + (µ− 1
2
σ2)(T − t)
σ
√
T − t , (21)
where r is replaced with the expected continuously compounded return on the ﬁrm, µ. This
is due to the fact that this solution is obtained under the true probability measure and
can be compared with empirically observed default probabilities. DD measures the size (in
standard deviations) of the random shock required to induce bankruptcy for a ﬁrm. Then,
the corresponding implied probability, P, of default is
P (V (T ) < D|V (t)) = Φ
[
− log(V/D) + (µ−
1
2
σ2)(T − t)
σ
√
T − t
]
= Φ [−DD] . (22)
If the Merton model holds, this probability of default should be a suﬃcient statistic for the
default forecasts. This requires eﬃcient markets (Lando, 2004). For a given time to maturity,
the probability of default is a function of the ﬁrm's value to debt ratio, its volatility and
its asset return. Therefore, this measure can be both increasing and decreasing with time to
maturity and the evolution of the return and the volatility through time.
For a ﬁrm with asset to debt ratio of 1.5, asset mean of 10% and a volatility of 20%, Figure
(2) shows the probability of default in the Merton model for 10 years to maturity. The
probability of default is increasing with time until a certain point where it peak. This is
because the uncertainty is low for a short horizon when the ﬁrm to debt ratio exceeds 1. For
diﬀerent calibrations, one may obtain diﬀerent shapes. If the default probability is 2.5%, the
DD is 1.96. The ﬁnancial interpretation is that the debt value is lower than the asset value
by 1.96 standard deviations.
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Figure 2: Probability of default as a function of time to maturity in the Merton model.
Calibration: µ = 0.1; σ = 0.2; V
D
= 1.5; T − t = 10
Focusing on asset values implies valuing all future cash ﬂows of the ﬁrm, rather than focusing
on a single period. The classical corporate ﬁnance approach to default is to project future
free cash ﬂows to see whether they allow the timely repayment of debt, interest and principal.
The relevant cash ﬂows are then the cash ﬂows from operations left for the lenders and equity
holders after all economic outﬂows required to maintain the operating ability of the ﬁrm are
paid. These future free cash ﬂows should be high enough to face the future debt obligations.
Using the discounted value of the free cash ﬂows as the ﬁrm's asset value is an elegant way of
summarizing the information. A short term view of the cash ﬂows is not a relevant criterion
for solvency. A temporary shortage of cash does not trigger default as long as there are
chances of improvement in the future. Persistent cash ﬂow deﬁciencies make a default highly
likely. Temporary deﬁciencies do not, but the market view synthesizes this information.
2.3 The Moody`s KMV (MKMV) approach
Bharath and Shumway (2008) states that the ﬁrst step to empirically implement the Mer-
ton model is to estimate the standard deviation of the equity, σE, either from historical
stock return data or from option-implied volatility data. Further, it can be shown that the
relationship between equity and asset volatility under the Black & Scholes assumptions is
9
σE = (
V
S
)Φ(d1)σ, (23)
where σ is the standard deviation of the ﬁrm's asset value and d1 is given by equation (16).
The second step is to measure the ﬁrm`s liabilities. Crosbie and Bohn (2003) deﬁned the
default point as
0.5× long − term debt+ short− term debt, (24)
because MKMV has found that ﬁrms generally do not default when their asset values reaches
the book value of their total liabilities. The debt level triggering a default is unclear since
debt amortizes by fractions according to some schedule. Reﬁnancing can pull down the
default point and the long-term nature of some of the liabilities provides some breathing
space.
The third step is to collect values of the risk free rate and the market value of the ﬁrm's
equity. After performing these three steps we have values for all variables in the Merton
model except for V. The fourth step in estimating the model is to solve the equations (15)
and (23) numerically for the value of V and σ.
An actual test of whether this is a good model for default would then look at how well
DD has historically predicted defaults. A simple test would be to group the distances to
default into small intervals, small enough to consider the default probability as a constant
over the interval but large enough to include enough ﬁrms, then the default frequency within
each bucket would be a reasonably accurate estimate of the default probability. This would
produce an empirical curve. (Lando, 2004). Those measures are found to diﬀer from the
model. Therefore, the measure of distance to default utilized by Moody`s KMV is slightly
diﬀerent and is reported in Crosbie and Bohn (2003) as
Distance
to default
=
Market value
of assets
− Default
point
Market value
of assets
× Asset
volatility
. (25)
The relevant net worth of the company is the market value of the ﬁrm's assets minus the
ﬁrm's default point. The market measure of net worth must be considered in the context of
the ﬁrm's business risk. The asset risk is measured by the asset volatility and is the standard
deviation of the annual percentage change in the asset value. This measure for the risk of
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default compares the market net worth to the size of a one standard deviation move in asset
value. The default probability can be computed directly from the distance-to-default if the
probability distribution of the asset is known.
Figure 3: Determination of the default probability in the MKMV approach. Source: Crosbie
and Bohn (2003).
Figure (3) illustrates graphically the MKMV approach. There are six variables that deter-
mine the default probability of a ﬁrm over some horizon, from now until time T:
1. The current asset value
2. The distribution of the asset value at time T.
3. The volatility of the future asset value.
4. The level of the default point.
5. The expected rate of growth in the asset value over the horizon.
6. The length of the horizon T.
Once the values for these variables are obtained, equation (25) is used to ﬁnd the distance
to default. MKMV obtain the relationship between distance to default and the probability
of default from data on historical defaults and bankruptcy frequencies. This distribution
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has wider tails than the Normal distribution mainly because of uncertainty in calculating
the default point. The shaded area in Figure (3) is the Expected Default Frequency (EDF)
which is deﬁned as the probability of default during a given horizon of for example 1 year.
Default is a relatively rare event and there is considerable variation in default probabilities
across ﬁrms. For example, the probability of default for an AAA-rated company is around
0.02% per annum, but the same probability is around 4% for a CCC-rated ﬁrm. Moody's
KMV has implemented an empirical version of the Black-Scholes-Merton model which ac-
tually performs well. Their one year accuracy ratio was on average over 80% between 1983
and 2002 (Cantor and Mann, 2003).
It is important to point out that there are a number of things which diﬀerentiate the Merton
DD model and the Moody's KMV (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). First of all, the MKMV
allows for various classes and maturities of debt. Second, they use their own large historical
database to estimate the empirical distribution of changes in distance to default and cal-
culate default probabilities based on that distribution. Finally, they also make proprietary
adjustments to the accounting information that they use to calculate the face value of the
debt.
In this paper, we use an extended Merton model to investigate the probabilities of joint
default. Due to the advent of innovative corporate debt products and credit derivatives,
academics and practitioners have shown renewed interest in models that forecast corporate
defaults. Diﬀerent applications of the Merton model are widely applied in this research and
it is a clever application of classic ﬁnance theory. But it is a unusual forecasting model.
Most forecasting models constructed by econometricians involve posing a model and then
estimating the model with method of moments or maximum-likelihood techniques. The
Merton model replaces estimation with something more like calibration.
How well a model performs in forecasting depends on how realistic its assumptions are.
Among other things, the standard Merton model assumes that the underlying value of each
ﬁrm follows a geometric Brownian motion. If the models strong assumptions are violated,
it should be possible to construct a reduced-form model with more accuracy. The standard
Merton model is known for systematically underestimate default probability when compared
with historical default rates. One explanation of this is that it uses the normal distribution
which not includes the possibility of fat tails. Default correlation can inﬂuence the asset
value distribution and should be included in a structural model of default.
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3 Default correlation and joint default probability
3.1 Deﬁnitions and applications
Default probabilities are inﬂuenced by common background variables which can be observable
or unobservable. Firms share a common dependence on the economic environment, which
result in cyclical correlation. Therefore, default events of companies are often correlated.
A risk manager should be concerned about three quantities while measuring the credit risk:
the probability of default for each individual position over various investment horizons, the
joint probability of default between every pair of counterparties over various investment
horizons and the loss given default for each ﬁrm. The most crucial and the most diﬃcult
part is estimating the joint probability of default.
Zhou (2001) argues that the joint probability of default is important in credit risk analysis
for several reasons. First, there is an increasing market for credit derivatives. For example,
one type of credit derivatives, letter of credit-backed debt, is issued by a ﬁnancial institution
to the buyer of the debt and promises that the seller will receive payment on time and in the
correct amount. Thus, two types of credit events have to occur before the issuer experience
a loss; both the ﬁnancial institution and the buyer have to default. Furthermore, a simple
credit default swap (CDS) can be viewed as default insurance on loans or bonds. The buyer
pays a premium in the form of an annuity until the time of the credit event or until the
maturity, whichever is ﬁrst (Duﬃe and Singleton, 2003). This insurance will only be valid if
the issuer has not defaulted and loss will happen if both the issuer of the CDS and the debt
default.
Second, credit clustering generates greater dispersion in the distribution of credit losses.
This implies greater likelihood of large losses. Constructing a portfolio implies combining
assets/securities of multiple ﬁrms. An increase in the joint probabilities of default could
lead to losses that exceed most of the worst estimates. As an example, collateralized debt
obligations backed by subprime debt have been at the heart of the ﬁnancial crisis that
started in 2007 and lead to a great number of bank failures. Hence, quantifying correctly
the probabilities of joint default in a portfolio of ﬁxed income securities is crucial.
To understand default correlation, it is convenient to deﬁne two random variables D1(t) and
D2(t) that describe the default status of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 at time T, as in Zhou (2001):
Di(t) =
1 if firm i defaults by T0 otherwise , i = 1, 2. (26)
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It is reasonable to assume that when one entity defaults, the other entity have a higher
likelihood of defaulting either because of the pressure from the general economy or because
both ﬁrms belong to the same industry. From the deﬁnition of the correlation between two
variables and because D1(t) and D2(t) are Bernoulli binomial random variables, we have
that the probability, P, of joint default is
P (D1(t) = 1 and D2(t) = 1) = E [D1(t)]E [D2(t)]+Corr [D1(t), D2(t)]
√
V ar [D1(t)]V ar [D2(t)],
(27)
where E is the expectation operator, Corr [D1(t), D2(t)] is the correlation between the default
status of the two ﬁrms and V ar [Di(t)] is the variance to the default status of ﬁrm i. The
expected default probability and the variance for ﬁrm i are given by
E [Di(t)] = P (Di(t) = 1) (28)
and
V ar [Di(t)] = P (Di(t) = 1)× [1− P (Di(t) = 1)] , (29)
respectively.
Figure 4: The joint default probability of two ﬁrms.
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Figure (4) shows possible ﬁrm value distributions for two companies for a given horizon.
As we see from these distributions, Firm 1 and 2 have diﬀerent debt levels, volatilities and
expected asset values. In this example, we assume that the default event occur whenever the
asset value gets lower than the debt and that the joint default of a pair of obligors occurs
whenever both of them have asset values bellow the debt values. The joint probability of
default is represented by the area under the left and down rectangle between the origin of
the axes in Figure (4) and the two lines representing the debt levels of two ﬁrms. The joint
probability of default embeds the correlation of default events. If the annual probabilities
of default for ﬁrm 1 and 2 are 1% and 3%, then the annual joint probability of default is
1%·3%=0.03% if they are uncorrelated. But if the correlation equals 0.3, the annual joint
probability of default would increase by 0.3·√0.009 · 0.0291=0.51% to 0.54%. This is a huge
increase in the joint probability of default.
Asset value simulations are usually employed when generating correlation between credit
events. Within the option theoretic framework, there is common to use a Monte Carlo
simulation methodology when generating correlated stochastic processes for the asset values.
The random asset values at the horizon depend on common factors and ﬁrm speciﬁc risk.
The ﬁrst can be generated through a correlation structure in the asset dynamics, the latter
can be generated through the ﬁrm speciﬁc volatility. A model of two ﬁrms that should
capture the probability of joint default have to generate simulated asset values for both
ﬁrms and assigning default values whenever both the simulated asset values falls below the
default points.
3.2 Default correlation in the standard Merton model
3.2.1 The case of two ﬁrms
In the simplest case of joint default, we consider ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2. With t = 0, the asset
dynamics of ﬁrm i is
dV i(ti)
V i(ti)
= µidt+ σidW
i(ti), V
i
0 > 0; i = 1, 2. (30)
(W 1(t1),W
2(t2)) is a two dimensional Brownian motion with correlation ρ, i.e. (W
1(t1),W
2(t2)) ∼
Φ [0,ΣW ] with variance-covariance matrix
ΣW =
(
t1 ρ
√
t1t2
ρ
√
t1t2 t2
)
, (31)
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where ti is the change in time.
Using Itô`s lemma we get
V i(t) = V i0 exp((µi −
1
2
σ2i )t+ σiW
i(ti)). (32)
In the classical Merton framework, the joint probability of ﬁrm 1 to default at T1 and ﬁrm
2 to default at T2 is
P (T1, T2) = P (V
1(T1) < D1, V
2(T2) < D2)
= Φ2
[
ρ,− log(V 1/D1)+(µ1− 12σ21)T1
σ1
√
T1
,− log(V 2/D2)+(µ2− 12σ22)T2
σ2
√
T2
] . (33)
where Φ2 [ρ, x, y] is the bivariate standard normal distribution function, with linear correla-
tion parameter ρ < 1, given by
Φ2(ρ, x, y) =
ˆ a
−∞
ˆ b
−∞
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2 exp(
2ρxy − x2 − y2
2(1− ρ2) )dxdy. (34)
By using results from probability theory, a host of other useful probabilities can be derived.
For example, the probability of default of ﬁrm 1 at time T 1 conditional on the default of
ﬁrm 2 at time T2 is
P (T1 | T2) =
Φ2
[
ρ,− log(V 1/D1)+(µ1− 12σ21)T1
σ1
√
T1
,− log(V 2/D2)+(µ2− 12σ22)T2
σ2
√
T2
]
Φ
[
− log(V 2/D2)+(µ2− 12σ22)T2
σ2
√
T2
] . (35)
Also, the probability of at least one default or survival probabilities can be calculated.
3.2.2 The multiple ﬁrms' case
In the case of many issuers, the computation is a bit more challenging because it involves
the use of the multivariate normal distribution. If the probability that ﬁrm i will default at
time t is deﬁned as
P (Vi(T ) < Di|Vi(t)) = Φ
[
− log(Vi/Di) + (µi −
1
2
σ2i )(T − t)
σi
√
T − t
]
= Φ [−DDi] , (36)
then for N ﬁrms, the probability of joint default is given by
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P (V1(T ) < D1, V2(T ) < D2, ..., VN(T ) < DN) = ΦN [−DD1,−DD2, ...,−DDN , ρ12, ρ13, ...] ,
(37)
where DDi is deﬁned as in equation (36) and ΦN is the Nth dimensional multivariate standard
normal distribution.
3.3 Moody's KMV approach to account for correlation
To create a comprehensive credit portfolio model, Moody's KMV uses, in addition to the EDF
values for each ﬁrm, the joint default frequency (JDF) to determine asset value correlations
(Kealhofer and Bohn, 1993). This measure can be calculated by focusing on the EFDi
measure for the individual ﬁrm i and the correlation between each part of the ﬁrm's market
asset value. Mathematically, this is given by
JDF = Φ2(Φ(−EDF1),Φ(−EDF2), ρA), (38)
where ρA is the correlation between ﬁrm 1 asset return and ﬁrm 2 asset return and Φ is the
standard normal distribution function.
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4 A model of joint default probabilities
4.1 Time-varying and correlated Sharpe ratios and volatilities.
The credit spread puzzle is deﬁned as the inability of structural models, when calibrated
to default probabilities, loss rates and Sharpe ratios, to predict spread levels across rating
categories consistent with historical market spreads (Amato and Remolona, 2003). Chen,
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2008) found that the standard Merton model predicted a
four-year Baa-Aaa spread that falls well below historical spreads when they calibrated the
model to match historical default rates, recovery rates, means and volatilities. They in-
vestigated channels through which the predicted spreads could be increased. One of these
channels was modeling time-variation in the Sharpe ratio, which is deﬁned as the ratio of
the expected equity premium to the expected standard deviation,
S =
µ− r
σ
. (39)
Time variation in Sharpe ratios has long been recognized as an important channel for ex-
plaining the high risk premium on stocks. It seems therefore natural to investigate how a
model consisting of this time-variation, calibrated to match empirical probabilities of de-
fault, can explain the joint probabilities of default between two companies. In this paper,
we propose a multivariate model to investigate the impact of time varying and correlated
means and volatilities on the probabilities of joint default. The analysis is conducted in the
standard Merton model framework.
It is an empirical fact that the default rates are highest during recessions. When times are
bad, the default probability is high, (...) and when times are good, the default probability is
low (Bruche and Gonzalez-Aguado, 2006). A company's ability to pay its liabilities depends
on the ability to generate proﬁts, which may be sharply impaired in a recession. Helwege
and Kleiman (1996) for example investigated the relationship between credit quality and
macroeconomic variables on default rates and found that the model improved signiﬁcantly
when the GDP growth was included in the regression. High default rates during recessions
are generated in the Merton model through ﬁrm value dropping toward the default point.
Also, changes in equity markets are correlated. Longin and Solnik (1995), among others,
studied the correlation of monthly excess return for seven major countries over 30 years and
found that the correlation matrices where high and unstable over time. Many other papers
have also found similar results. Changes in equity values are tightly linked to changes in
ﬁrm values.
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Time-variation in Sharpe ratio could be understood within the framework developed by
Cochrane (2001). He states that asset prices should equal expected discounted cash ﬂows.
But empirical evidence found that discount rates vary over time. A signiﬁcant part of the
variation in prices is due to news. Following Cochrane (2001), we deﬁne the price of an asset,
pt, as
pt = E(mt+1xt+1), (40)
where xt+1 is the asset payoﬀ and mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor. If we divide the
payoﬀ, xt+1, by the price, pt, we get the gross return, Rt+1. Thus, equation (40) becomes
1 = E(mt+1Rt+1). (41)
This basic pricing equation should hold for any asset, stock, bond, option, etc. In a standard
asset pricing model, a representative investor chooses how much to save and how much to
consume subject to his budget constraint. Further, we assume that the investor's utility
function, U, is deﬁned over current and future values of consumption,
U(ct, ct+1) = u(ct) + βEt [u(ct+1)] . (42)
Here, ct denotes the consumption at date t and β is the subjective discount factor which
capture investor's impatience and aversion to risk. The representative investor is maximiz-
ing utility subject to his budget constraints. The maximization problem delivers the ﬁrst
order conditions for an optimal consumption and portfolio choice. Solving these ﬁrst order
conditions for the prices, pt, gives
3
pt = Et
[
β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
xt+1
]
, (43)
where u′(ct) is the marginal utility at time t. We can now deﬁne the stochastic discount
factor as
mt+1 ≡ βu
′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
(44)
which measures the rate at which the investor is willing to substitute consumption at time
t+1 for consumption at time t. By the use of the deﬁnition of covariance between two
3See Cochrane (2001) for detailed derivations.
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variables and the result that the risk free rate is given by r = 1
E[m]
, the expected excess
return of asset i is
E(Ri)− r = −cov
[
u′(ct+1), Rit+1
]
E [u′(ct)]
. (45)
If an asset has positive correlation with consumption, it will have a negative correlation
with marginal utility if u′′(·) < 0. This is a standard assumption of a utility function. Assets
whose returns covary positively with consumption make consumption more volatile and must
earn return in excess of the risk free rate to induce investors to hold them.
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) explain why a ﬁrm's value drops far more than the drop
in expected dividends through recessions. They explain the drop through a variation in
investors' attitude toward risk. When the economy goes into recessions, investors have fewer
resources to maintain their accustomed living standards and thus are less willing to bear
ﬁnancial risk. To induce them to hold stocks instead of risk free short-term Treasury bills,
for a given level of stock market risk, the expected equity premium must increase. Therefore,
stock prices fall during recessions because dividends are discounted by a higher rate as a result
of the increase in the equity premium. This time-variation in the expected equity premium
can be generated in our model by allowing the gross return of the ﬁrms to change over time,
denoted as the mean, µ.
The expected excess returns are correlated through time and between ﬁrms on the basis of
macro-conditions. Ferson and Harvey (1991) found that the average risk premium of size
and industry-grouped common stock portfolios is associated with their sensitivity to common
economic variables. Among a group of economic variables, the risk premium associated with
a stock market index captures the largest component of the predictable variation in the stock
market return. Other papers, like Lewellen (1997), found that factors like book-to-market
predict economically and statistically signiﬁcant time-variation in expected stock returns. In
our multivariate model, we therefore also allow the returns (means) to be correlated across
ﬁrms and across time.
The standard Merton model assumes constant asset volatility. However, there is strong
empirical evidence that the volatility of the stock returns are time-varying. For instance,
Schwert (1989) found that asset return are more volatile during a recession. A number of
other features of volatility are observed:4
· Volatility clustering - the tendency for volatility to appear in bunches. Thus large
returns of either signs are expected to follow large returns and vice versa.
4See for example Brooks (2002).
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· Leverage eﬀect - the tendency for volatility to rise more following a large price fall
than following a price rise of the same magnitude, i.e. stock volatility is negatively
correlated with stock returns.
This gives good reasons to allow for time-variation in the volatility. There is also good
evidence that volatility is mean-reverting. If standard deviations on equities, T-bills, etc.
had been constant, all lines in Figure (5) have been ﬂat. But the lines indicate that the
uncertainty is lower for the long run than the short run. The annualized standard deviation
of the return on equities is 18% for one year horizon, whereas it is 14% with a horizon of
25 years. This means that the standard deviation on equities has historically been mean
reverting toward a long run mean.
Figure 5: Variability of multi-period asset returns. Quarterly data, 1952(1)-1999(4). Source:
Campbell and Viceira (2002)
The characteristics of the volatility outlined above have been for the univariate time series,
relating the volatility of the series to only information contained in that series' history. But
ﬁnancial asset prices do not evolve independently of the market around them. Other assets
may therefore contain relevant information for the volatility of a series. Such evidence has
been found by for example Engle, Ng and Rothschild (1990). In addition, it is possible that
deterministic events also have an impact on the volatility series. In our model, we therefore
also allow for time-varying volatilities which may be correlated between ﬁrms.
4.2 The proposed model
We consider two ﬁrms and specify the dynamics of ﬁrm i as
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dV i(t)
V i(t)
= µi(t)dt+ σi(t)dB
i(t), V i0 > 0; for i = 1, 2. (46)
(B1(t), B2(t)) is a two-dimensional correlated Brownian motion with variance-covariance
matrix given by
ΣB =
(
1 ρV
ρV 1
)
, (47)
where ρV is the correlation between the two Brownian motions. The diﬀerence from the
previous literature approach is that we allow the drift and volatility terms to be time-
varying and correlated. The means in the ﬁrms' dynamics are assumed to follow a bivariate
geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
[
dµ1(t)
dµ2(t)
]
=
(
β1 0
0 β2
)(
µ1(t)
µ2(t)
)
dt+
(
µ1(t) 0
0 µ2(t)
)(
σµ11 σ
µ
12
σµ21 σ
µ
22
) (
dZ1(t)
dZ2(t)
)
.
(48)
(Z1(t), Z2(t)) is a two-dimensional correlated Brownian motion with variance-covariance
matrix given by
ΣZ =
(
1 ρµ
ρµ 1
)
, (49)
where ρµ is the correlation between the two Brownian motions. β1 and β2 are the expected
drift rates per unit of time for µ1 and µ2. Σ
µ =
(
σµ11 σ
µ
12
σµ21 σ
µ
22
)
is the volatility matrix of the
bivariate process.
The volatilities are assumed to follow a bivariate CIR process
[
dσ1(t)
dσ2(t)
]
=
(
α1 0
0 α2
)[(
θ1
θ2
)
−
(
σ1(t)
σ2(t)
)]
+
( √
σ1(t) 0
0
√
σ2(t)
)(
σσ11 σ
σ
12
σσ21 σ
σ
22
)(
dW 1(t)
dW 2(t)
)
.
(50)
(W 1(t),W 2(t)) is a two-dimensional correlated Brownian motion with variance-covariance
matrix given by
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ΣW =
(
1 ρσ
ρσ 1
)
, (51)
where ρσ is the correlation between the two Brownian motions.
(
θ1
θ2
)
is the long run
mean of the volatility vector. Therefore, the matrix
(
α1 0
0 α2
)
can be interpreted as the
mean rate of reversion to the long run means of the volatility. The size of the parameters
controls how fast the drift coeﬃcients change. Σσ=
(
σσ11 σ
σ
12
σσ21 σ
σ
22
)
is the volatility matrix of
the bivariate process.
Since we consider the Merton framework, we assume that default happens only at maturity
of the debt if the ﬁrm value is below the default point. The probability of bankruptcy at
time T for ﬁrm i, conditional on the value of assets at time t is
P (V i(T ) < Di|V i(t)) = Φ
[
− log(V
i(t)/Di) + (µi(t)− 12σ2i (t))(T − t)
σi(t)
√
T − t
]
= Φ [−DDi(t)] .
(52)
The mean, µi, and the volatility, σi, are now assumed to be functions of time and are given
by the equations (48) and (50).
The joint probability of ﬁrm 1 to default at T1 and ﬁrm 2 to default at T2 is
P (T1, T2) = p(V
1(T1) < D1, V
2(T2) < D2)
= Φ2
[
r,− log(V 1(t)/D1)+(µ1(t)− 12σ21(t))T1
σ1(t)
√
T1
,− log(V 2(t)/D2)+(µ2(t)− 12σ22(t))T2
σ2(t)
√
T2
] , (53)
where r is the correlation coeﬃcient.
The model can be extended to account for multiple ﬁrms, but in this paper we will only
consider the bivariate case.
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5 Monte Carlo analysis
5.1 Calibration strategy
The benchmark calibration in this paper follows mostly the work in Zhang, Zhou and Zhu
(2009). We calibrate the parameters to ﬁt the sample averages of one ﬁrm with rating
category A (Firm 1) and one ﬁrm with rating category Ba (Firm 2). Both ﬁrm values, V1
and V2, are initially set to 100.
We set the starting value for the volatility process of Firm 1, σ10, to 24.65%, the long run asset
volatility, θ1, to 4.24% and the mean reversion coeﬃcient, α1, to 0.74. Historical leverage
ratio is 43.29% for A-rated companies. In the original Merton framework, the default point
is set to the face value of debt. However, Leland (2004) argues that the default boundary is
close to 75% of the face value of the debt. This agrees with Moody's KMV. They found that
the default point generally lies somewhere between total liabilities and short term liabilities
(Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). The default point, D1, is therefore set to 32.47. The starting
value for the mean process, µ10, is set to 9%. This reﬂects a risk-free rate, r, of 5%, a risk
premium, E(R1)− r, of 6% and a payout ratio, δ1, of 2%.
We set the starting value for the volatility process of Firm 2, σ20, to 30.27%, the long run
asset volatility, θ2, to 4.9% and the mean reversion coeﬃcient, α2, to 0.8. The historical
leverage ratio is 58.63% for Ba-rated companies. The default point, D2, is therefore set to
75% of the leverage ratio, which is 43.97. The starting value for the mean process, µ20, is
set to 11.5%. This reﬂects a risk-free rate, r, of 5%, a risk premium, E(R2)− r, of 8.5% and
a payout ratio, δ2, of 2%.
The basic strategy for the remaining parameters in the model are to calibrate them such that
the Monte Carlo simulations gives approximately 5-year and 10-year default probabilities
that correspond to the empirical default probabilities, as reported by Zhou (2001). The
5-year default probabilities are 0.62% for an average A-ﬁrm and 11.85% for an average Ba-
ﬁrm. The 10-year default probabilities are 1.96% for an average A-ﬁrm and 19.48% for an
average Ba-ﬁrm. By trial and error, the correlations between the ﬁrm values, ρV , means, ρµ,
and volatilities, ρσ, are set to 0.1, 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. The volatility matrices of the
bivariate processes driving the means and the volatilities are set to Σµ =
(
0.2 0.25
0.5 0.2
)
and
Σσ =
(
0.025 0.03
0.03 0.05
)
. The drifts of the mean processes, β1 and β2, are set to 0.77 and 0.3.
Table (1) from the Appendix displays a summary of the benchmark calibration.
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5.2 Monte Carlo algorithm
We used Matlab R2011a for simulation of the model. For an initial calibration, we set the
time to maturity, T, to 10 years and the total number of steps within these 10 years, N, to
100. The number of simulations for each j steps where j=1:N, Nsim, are set to 1,000,000.
The main steps of the Monte Carlo algorithm are as follows:
1. Generate a 2xN matrix for the two-dimensional correlated Brownian motion driving
the ﬁrm values,
2. Generate a 2xN matrix for the two-dimensional correlated Brownian motion driving
the means,
3. Generate a 2xN matrix for the two-dimensional correlated Brownian motion driving
the volatilities,
4. For each j step, generate Nsim means, volatilities and values for each ﬁrm. The pro-
cesses for those are given by (48), (50) and (46) respectively,
5. For each j step, we count for each ﬁrm how many times, out of Nsim simulations, the
ﬁrm value is bellow the default point,
6. For each j step, we count how many times, out of Nsim simulations, both ﬁrm values
are bellow their default points,
7. For each j step, we calculate the probability of default for each ﬁrm and the joint
probability of default by dividing the numbers obtained in steps 5 and 6 by Nsim.
The probabilities are plotted as a function of time to maturity. See the Appendix for the
Matlab code.
5.3 Simulation results
5.3.1 Benchmark calibration
The benchmark calibration matches the sample averages of one ﬁrm with rating category A
and one ﬁrm with rating category Ba. Figure (6) plots the probability of joint default from
the proposed model for a horizon of 10 years to maturity. The joint probability of default
varies signiﬁcantly over diﬀerent horizons. One can see that the probability of joint default
is generally very small over the short horizon because quick defaults are rare and nearly
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idiosyncratic. Then it increases and ﬁnally it slowly decreases as it approaches the maturity
date. The decrease in the joint probability of default over longer horizons may be due to
the relationship of the time period being studied to the average business cycle. If the time
period studied covers the entire ebb of the business cycle, the defaults caused by the general
economic conditions average out over the period, thus lowering the default correlation.
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Figure 6: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for the benchmark
calibration.
5.3.2 Two A-rated ﬁrms and two Ba-rated ﬁrms
We can also calibrate the proposed model such that it matches the sample averages of two
A-rated ﬁrms and two Ba-rated ﬁrms. We set both ﬁrm values, V1 and V2, to 100 as before.
For the calibration Two A-rated ﬁrms, we set the starting values for the volatilities, σ10
and σ20, to 23% and 26% with both long run asset volatilities, θ1 and θ2, to 4.24% and both
mean reversion coeﬃcients, α1 and α2, to 0.74. The default points, D
1 and D2, are set to
30 and 35. Both starting values for the means, µ10 and µ20, are set to 9% and the drifts of
the asset means, β1 and β2, are set to 0.77. The remaining parameters are similar to the
benchmark calibration.
For the calibration Two Ba-rated ﬁrms, we set the starting values for the volatilities, σ10
and σ20, to 29% and 32% with both long run asset volatilities, θ1 and θ2, to 4.9% and both
mean reversion coeﬃcients, α1 and α2, to 0.8. The default points, D
1 and D2, are set to
42 and 45. Both starting values for the means, µ10 and µ20, are set to 11.5% and the drifts
of the asset means, β1 and β2, are set to 0.3. The remaining parameters are similar to the
benchmark calibration.
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Figure (7) shows the probability of joint default from the proposed model for two A-rated
ﬁrms and two Ba-rated ﬁrms. One could see that the probability of joint default is generally
low for A-rated companies. This is mainly due to the fact that when the credit quality
increases, the probability of default decrease. Furthermore, companies with high rating are
more susceptible to company-speciﬁc problems (Lucas, 1995). Thus, defaults are typically
isolated to the individual company and do not produce so much default correlation.
The probability of joint default for two Ba-rated companies is signiﬁcantly larger compared
to the benchmark calibration and the case of two A-rated companies. Lucas (1995) argues
that lower rated ﬁrms have asset values closer to their default points and are relatively more
susceptible to problems in the general economy. They are therefore more likely to be pushed
into default because of an economic downturn. As economic conditions aﬀect all low-rated
credits simultaneously, defaults among these ﬁrms are more likely to be correlated.
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Figure 7: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for two A-rated
ﬁrms and two Ba-rated ﬁrms.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
To analyze the dynamics of the proposed model, we investigate how increases and decreases
in the values for the parameters of the proposed model impact the probability of joint default.
5.4.1 Changes in D1 and D2
Figures (8) and (9) show the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
for diﬀerent default points for Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively.
28
When the default point of one of the ﬁrms increases (decreases), the joint probability of
default increases (decreases). This is because the ﬁrm's asset value is closer to the default
point and the probability of default increases. Thus the probability of joint default also
increases.
With the same intuition, if one of the ﬁrms asset value increases (decreases), the joint
probability of default decreases (increases).
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Default point Firm 1 = 20
Default point Firm 1 = 50
Figure 8: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent D1.
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Default point Firm 2 = 20
Default point Firm 2 = 60
Figure 9: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent D2.
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5.4.2 Changes in ρV , ρµ and ρσ
Figures (10)-(12) display the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
for diﬀerent correlations between the ﬁrm values, means and volatilities, respectively.
In general, one could see that higher (lower) correlation between the ﬁrm values, the means
or the volatilities implies higher (lower) joint probability of default. If one ﬁrm defaults, it
is more likely that the value of the other ﬁrm also have declined and moved closer to its
default point given that the ﬁrm values, the means or the volatilities are highly correlated.
If the ﬁrm values, means or volatilities are negatively correlated, the probability of joint
default generally decreases. This is because the default correlation and asset level correlation
have the same sign.
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Firm value correlation = 0.3
Firm value correlation = −0.1
Figure 10: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent ρV .
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Mean correlation = 0.3
Mean correlation = −0.1
Figure 11: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent ρµ.
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Volatility correlation = 0.6
Volatility correlation = −0.4
Figure 12: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent ρσ.
5.4.3 Changes in σ10 and σ20
Figures (13) and (14) show the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
when diﬀerent starting values for the volatilities are considered for Firm 1 and Firm 2,
respectively.
One could notice that higher (lower) initial volatility generally implies higher (lower) joint
probability of default. Higher uncertainty for one of the ﬁrms increases the probability that
the ﬁrm will default. This increases the joint probability of default, given the correlation
structure.
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Initial volatility Firm 1 = 0.3
Initial volatility Firm 1 = 0.2
Figure 13: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σ10.
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Initial volatility Firm 2 = 0.4
Initial volatility Firm 2 = 0.2
Figure 14: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σ20.
5.4.4 Changes in θ1 and θ2
Figures (15) and (16) show the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
for diﬀerent long run means of the volatilities of the two ﬁrms.
Higher (lower) long run volatility implies lower (higher) joint probability of default.
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Long run volatility Firm 1 = 0.06
Long run volatility Firm 1 = 0.02
Figure 15: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent θ1.
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Long run volatility Firm 2 = 0.06
Long run volatility Firm 2 = 0.02
Figure 16: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent θ2.
5.4.5 Changes in α1 and α2
Figures (17) and (18) show the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
for diﬀerent mean rate of reversion of the two ﬁrms.
Higher (lower) mean rate of reversion implies lower (higher) joint probability of default.
Higher mean rate of reversion implies that the volatility stabilizes around the long run
volatility faster and thus lowers the joint probability of default.
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Mean rate of reversion Firm 1 = 0.7
Mean rate of reversion Firm 1 = 0.8
Figure 17: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent α1.
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Mean rate of reversion Firm 2 = 0.9
Mean rate of reversion Firm 2 = 0.7
Figure 18: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent α2.
5.4.6 Changes in σσ11 and σ
σ
12
Figures (19) and (20) display the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
for diﬀerent σσ11 and σ
σ
12.
One could see that higher (lower) σσ11 and σ
σ
12 implies higher (lower) joint probability of
default. Higher volatility of the volatility process increases the uncertainty and thus increases
the joint probability of default.
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Vol. of vol. 11 = 0.04
Vol. of vol. 11 = 0.01
Figure 19: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σσ11.
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Vol. of vol. 12 = 0.06
Vol. of vol. 12 = 0.01
Figure 20: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σσ12.
5.4.7 Changes in σσ21 and σ
σ
22
Figures (21) and (22) show the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
for diﬀerent σσ21 and σ
σ
22.
One can notice that higher (lower) σσ21 and σ
σ
22 implies higher (lower) joint probability of
default. Same as above, higher volatility of the volatility process increases the uncertainty
and thus increases the joint probability of default.
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Vol. of vol. 21 = 0.06
Vol. of vol. 21 = 0.01
Figure 21: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σσ21.
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Vol. of vol. 22 = 0.1
Vol. of vol. 22 = 0.01
Figure 22: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σσ22.
5.4.8 Changes in µ10 and µ20
Figures (23) and (24) show the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
when diﬀerent starting values for the means of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are considered.
Higher (lower) mean implies lower (higher) joint default probability. When the expected
return of one of the ﬁrms increases, there is less likely that the asset value of the ﬁrm will
move toward the default boundary. This implies a lower joint probability of default.
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Mean of Firm 1 = 0.13
Mean of Firm 1 = 0.07
Figure 23: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent µ10.
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Mean of Firm 2 = 0.13
Mean of Firm 2 = 0.07
Figure 24: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent µ20.
5.4.9 Changes in β1 and β2
Figures (25) and (26) show the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
for diﬀerent expected drift rates of the mean processes of the two ﬁrms.
One could see that higher (lower) expected drift rates for the mean processes imply lower
(higher) joint probability of default. This is because higher expected drift rate for the
mean process of one of the ﬁrms implies a lower probability of default. This decreases the
probability of joint default.
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Expected drift rate Firm 1 = 0.8
Expected drift rate Firm 1 = 0.7
Figure 25: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent β1.
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Expected drift rate Firm 2 = 0.4
Expected drift rate Firm 2 = 0.2
Figure 26: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent β2.
5.4.10 Changes in σµ11 and σ
µ
12
Figures (27) and (28) show the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
for diﬀerent σµ11 and σ
µ
12.
Higher (lower) σµ11 and σ
µ
12 implies higher (lower) joint probability of default. Higher volatility
of the mean process increases the uncertainty and thus increases the joint probability of
default.
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Vol. of mean 11 = 0.4
Vol. of mean 11 = 0.1
Figure 27: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σµ11.
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Vol. of mean 12 = 0.4
Vol. of mean 12 = 0.1
Figure 28: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σµ12.
5.4.11 Changes in σµ21 and σ
µ
22
Figures (29) and (30) show the joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity
for diﬀerent σµ21 and σ
µ
22.
Higher (lower) σµ21 and σ
µ
22 implies higher (lower) joint probability of default. As before,
higher volatility of the mean process increases the uncertainty and thus increases the joint
probability of default.
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Vol. of mean 21 = 0.7
Vol. of mean 21 = 0.3
Figure 29: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σµ21.
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Vol. of mean 22 = 0.4
Vol. of mean 22 = 0.1
Figure 30: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity for diﬀerent σµ22.
5.4.12 Changes in T
Figure (31) shows the joint probability of default for diﬀerent T.
In the benchmark calibration, the time to maturity is set to 10 years. One could see that
there is no change in the probability of joint default within these 10 years when the time to
maturity is changed to 5 years or 20 years. Further, the probability of joint default continues
to decrease when the time to maturity exceed 10 years.
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Figure 31: The joint probability of default for diﬀerent T.
5.4.13 Changes in N and Nsim
Figures (32) and (33) show the joint probability of default for diﬀerent N and Nsim.
A higher number of time steps, N, will decrease the length of each step. One could see
that the number of steps does not impact signiﬁcantly the shape of the probability of joint
default. Further, increasing the number of simulations for each step, Nsim, will give more
accurate approximations and smoother looking curves because of the central limit theorem.
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N = 10
N = 200
Figure 32: The joint probability of default for diﬀerent N.
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Figure 33: The joint probability of default for diﬀerent Nsim.
5.5 Comparison of the proposed model and the standard model
The proposed model incorporates time-varying and correlated processes for the means and
volatilities driving ﬁrm values. To see how this aﬀects the probability of joint default, we
compare the proposed model with a standard model which only capture time-varying and
correlated ﬁrm values. Thus, the standard model has constant and independent means and
volatilities. The joint probability of default from the standard model is simulated within the
same Monte Carlo algorithm as in the proposed model.
The standard model is calibrated within the lines of the benchmark calibration. Both ﬁrm
values, V1 and V2, are initially set to 100. The default points, D
1 and D2, are set to 32.47
and 43.97. The volatility of the ﬁrms, σ1 and σ2, are set to 24.65% and 30.27%. Finally, the
means, µ1 and µ2, are set to 9% and 11.5%. The correlation between the ﬁrm values, ρV , is
set to 0.1.
In Figure (34), the joint probability of default from the proposed model and the standard
model are plotted. One could see that the joint probability paths from the two models are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. The standard model delivers a larger joint probability of default at
short horizons, but a lower joint probability of default for longer time horizons. It also has
an earlier peak.
The lower values for the joint probability of default generated by the standard model is
mainly due to lower correlation between the ﬁrms. Because means and volatilities now are
constant, the standard model does not produce so high correlation between the ﬁrm values
and thus lower the probability that both ﬁrms will default simultaneously.
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Further, the proposed model produces means that on average slowly increase over the horizon
because of the positive drift parameters. The standard model has constant means set to the
starting values in the proposed model (µ10 and µ20). Due to this feature, the probabilities of
default are driven down for longer horizons in the standard model as opposed to the proposed
model.
Finally, as one could see in Figure (35) and (36), the proposed model simulate ﬁrm values
that have greater dispersion than the standard model for a horizon of 5 years. This eﬀect
leads to a sharply increase in the probability of joint default for the proposed model.
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Figure 34: The joint probability of default as a function of time to maturity with the proposed
model and the standard model.
Figure 35: Firm value distribution for Firm 1 with the proposed model and the standard
model for a horizon of 5 years.
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Figure 36: Firm value distribution for Firm 2 with the proposed model and the standard
model for a horizon of 5 years.
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6 The implications and applications of the proposed model
6.1 Risk management implications of the proposed model
The proposed model implies that the joint probability of default is small for short horizons.
Thus, for loan portfolios consisting of short term credit (0-4 years), risk management should
mainly be focused upon default probabilities. But for loan portfolios consisting of long-
term credit (i.e. 5 to 10 years), the joint probability of default can be a signiﬁcant factor.
Also, the proposed model implies that the joint probability of default is generally large for
portfolios consisting of low-rated companies. Risk management requires models that are able
to capture these eﬀects because changes in the joint probability of default will aﬀect the loss
distribution for the portfolio.
Since lower correlation between asset values, means or volatilities generally implies a lower
joint probability of default, diversiﬁcation between regions and industries should lower the
probability of joint default for loan portfolios.
If the default probability of two loans doubles, the probability of joint default can be signiﬁ-
cantly more than double. Because of this dynamic nature of the probability of joint default,
active management is required. Changes in the parameters of the proposed model (volatility,
correlation, default point etc.) can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the joint probability of default.
6.2 The proposed model compared with empirical data
In order to compare the proposed model with empirical data, we need ﬁrm speciﬁc informa-
tion for two ﬁrms. Due to the lack of readily statistics on ﬁrm-speciﬁc default correlations,
we use pooled data to see if the proposed model can match average empirical joint default
probabilities between and within the rating categories A and Ba. These are computed using
historical cumulative default rates provided by Moody's Investors Service covering twenty-
four years of annual data from 1970 through 1993 as reported in Zhou (2001). The empirical
joint default probabilities are computed and reported by Lucas (1995) from the same data
set. The annual values are reported in Table (2) in the Appendix.
The cross-sectional diversity of the pool represent over 4 000 issuers, but the time series of
the data is short. Lucas (1995) states that twenty-four time periods are studied for the one-
year default correlation statistic, but only ﬁfteen overlapping time periods for the ten-year
statistic (1970 through 1979, 1971 through 1980,...,1984 through 1993). Thus, this pooled
data could give biased estimates of joint default probabilities.
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Furthermore, this comparison with empirical data depends on the true underlying default
probabilities for each rating category and that the default correlations remain the same over
time. However, this is not a pattern observed in time series.
Also, it is hard to say anything about default correlation among and between speciﬁc in-
dustries. The statistics used here are based on diversiﬁed portfolios, i.e. the whole universe
of Moody's-rated companies. Thus, it can be considered as an estimate of the base default
correlation caused by issuer reaction to the general economy (Lucas, 1995).
For this exercise, the calibration of the model follows mostly Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004).
However, some of the parameters are chosen such that the proposed model generates approx-
imately 5-year and 10-year default probabilities that correspond to the cumulative default
rates provided by Moody's Investors Service. Figures (37), (38) and (39) compare the model
simulated joint probability of default with one A-rated ﬁrm and one Ba-rated ﬁrm, two
Ba-rated ﬁrms and two A-rated ﬁrms with the empirical ones.
For the case with one A-rated ﬁrm and one Ba-rated ﬁrm, shown in Figure (37), the model
simulated joint probability of default matches the empirical data well. Also for the case with
two Ba-rated ﬁrms, shown in Figure (38), the model matches the empirical data well.
For the case with two A-rated ﬁrms, shown in Figure (39), the model simulated joint prob-
ability of default falls below the empirical data. There are several potential explanations for
this. In the ﬁrst place, the values for the parameters of the model could be misspeciﬁed.
Most of the parameters are tied down to historical values, but some of them are chosen such
that the model generates 5-year and 10-year default probabilities which correspond to the
cumulative default rates. Further, the model itself could be misspeciﬁed. We propose a new
way to model the stochastic processes for the assets, but it is possible that the model does
not capture all patterns in the asset dynamics. Finally, default rates are in general very
small for A-rated companies. Thus, the short time period considered in this data set can
give wrong estimates of default probabilities and default correlation.
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Figure 37: Model simulated joint probability of default compared with empirical joint prob-
ability of default for an average A-rated ﬁrm and an average Ba-rated ﬁrm. Source: Lucas
(1995), Zhou (2001).
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Figure 38: Model simulated joint probability of default compared with empirical joint prob-
ability of default for two average Ba-rated ﬁrms. Source: Lucas (1995), Zhou (2001).
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Figure 39: Model simulated joint probability of default compared with empirical joint prob-
ability of default for two average A-rated ﬁrms. Source: Lucas (1995), Zhou (2001).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a multivariate stochastic process for ﬁrm values that ﬁts better the
observed features of the ﬁnancial data than the diﬀusion-type stochastic processes assumed
in the standard Merton model. The proposed model incorporates two important features:
the fact that the Sharpe ratios and the volatilities of ﬁrms are time-varying and correlated
over time. Within the standard Merton framework, we calibrated the proposed model to
ﬁt sample averages between and within the rating categories A and Ba. By Monte Carlo
simulations, we investigated the dynamics of the proposed model with respect to the joint
probability of default.
The joint probability of default is important in understanding and predicting the behavior of
credit portfolios. If default events are correlated among ﬁrms, the joint probability of default
can be a signiﬁcant source of risk for a loan portfolio. Defaults can be more heavily clustered
than envisioned in the default correlation models currently used by ﬁnancial institutions.
The ﬁnancial crisis led to bank failures, mainly because of losses that exceeded the worst
estimates. Consequently, signiﬁcantly more capital might be required in order to survive
default losses, especially at high conﬁdence levels as the ones required by regulation. An
understanding of the joint probability of default is also crucial for the rating and risk analysis
of structured credit products, such as letter of credit-backed debt or credit default swaps.
There are also major concerns about the calibrations of portfolio and credit risk models.
In particular, estimation of default correlations is diﬃcult because they cannot be directly
measured for speciﬁc obligors (Jorion and Zhang, 2009). Current models seem to be unable
to reproduce the actual pattern of correlation among default events. Unlike the standard
model, we found that our proposed model delivers probabilities of the joint default closer to
what is observed in the data.
In this paper we considered only the case of two ﬁrms, but the model could be extended to the
case of multiple ﬁrms. Furthermore, an analysis of how time-varying and correlated means
and volatilities for ﬁrms' values aﬀect the loss distributions for typically bank portfolios
consisting of risky debt, would be of high interest. Future work will investigate in these
directions.
49

References
Amato, J. D. and Remolona, E. M. (2003): The Credit Spread Puzzle, BIS Quarterly
Review, December 2003.
Bessis, J. (2002): Risk management in banking. (2 ed.). John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
Bharath, S. T. and Shumway, T. (2008): Forecasting default with Merton distance to de-
fault model, The Review of Financial Studies 21, 1339-1369.
Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1973): The pricing of options and corporate liabilities, Journal
of Political Economy 81, 637-654.
Black, F. and Cox, J. C. (1976): Valuing corporate securities: Some eﬀects of bond inden-
ture provisions, Journal of Finance 31, 351-367.
Brooks, C. (2002): Introductory econometrics for ﬁnance (2 ed.). Cambridge University
Press, New York.
Bruche, M. and Gonzalez-Aguado, C. (2006): Recovery rates, default probabilities and the
credit cycle, Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 754-764
Cantor, R. M. and Mann, C. (2003): Measuring the Performance of Corporate Bond Rat-
ings. Special Comment, April 2003.
Campbell, J. Y. and Cochrane, J. H. (1999): By force of habit: A consumption- based
explanation of aggregate stock market behavior, Journal of Political Economy 107,
205-251.
Campbell, J. Y. and Viceira, L. M. (2002): Strategic asset allocation. Oxford University
Press, New York.
Chen, L., Collin-Dufresne P. and Goldstein, R.S. (2008): On the relation between the credit
spread puzzle and the equity premium puzzle, Review of Financial Studies (2009) 22,
3367-3409.
Cochrane, J. H. (2001): Asset pricing. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Crosbie, P. and Bohn, J. (2003): Modeling default risk. Moody's KMV Company.
51
Duﬃe, D. and Singleton, K. J. (2003): Credit risk: Pricing, measurement and management.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Duﬃe, D., Eckner, A., Horel, G. and Saita, L. (2009): Frailty correlated default, The
Journal of Finance 64, 2089-2123.
Engle, R. F., Ng, V. K. and Rothschild, M. (1990): Asset pricing with a factor-arch covari-
ance structure, Journal of Econometrics 45, 213-237.
Ferson, W. E. and Harvey, C. R. (1991): The variation of economic risk premiums, Journal
of Political Economy 99, 385-415.
Giesecke, K. (2004): Credit risk modeling and valuation: An introduction, In D. Shimko
(Ed.), Credit risk: Models and management, 487-526. Riskbooks, London.
Helwege, J. and Kleiman, P. (1996): Understanding aggregate default rates of high yield
bonds, Journal of Fixed Income 7, 55-62.
Jones, E. P., Mason, S. P. and Rosenfeld, E. (1984): Contingent claims analysis of corporate
capital structures: An empirical investigation, The Journal of Finance 39, 611-625.
Jorion, P. and Zhang, G. (2009): Credit contagion from counterparty risk, The Journal of
Finance 64, 2053-2087
Kealhofer, S. and Bohn, J. R. (1993): Portfolio management of default risk, KMV, San
Francisco.
Lando, D. (2004): Credit risk modeling. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Leland, H. E. (2004): Predictions of default probabilities in structural models of debt,
Journal of Investment Management 2, 5-20.
Lewellen, J. (1997): The time-series relations among expected return, risk and book-to-
market, Journal of Financial Economics 54, 5-43.
Longin, F. and Solnik B. (1995): Is the correlation in international equity returns constant:
19601990, Journal of International Money and Finance 14, 3-26.
Lucas, D. J. (1995): Default correlation and credit analysis, Journal of Fixed Income 4,
76-87.
Merton, R. C. (1973): Theory of rational option pricing, The Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science 4, 141-183.
52
Merton, R. C. (1974): On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest
rates, Journal of Finance 29, 449-470.
Schwert, G. W. (1989): Why does stock market volatility change over time, Journal of
Finance 44, 1115-1153.
Zhang, B. Y. B., Zhou, H. and Zhu, H. (2009): Explaining credit default swap spreads with
the equity volatility and jump risks of individual ﬁrms, Review of Financial Studies
22, 5099-5131.
Zhou, C. (2001): An analysis of default correlations and multiple defaults, The Review of
Financial Studies 14, 555-576.
53
Appendix
Table 1: Benchmark calibration.
Calibrated variables Firm 1 Firm 2 Calibration details/Literature source
Initial asset value V1, V2 100 100 Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004)
Initial asset mean µ10, µ20 (%) 9 11.5 Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004)
Initial asset volatility σ10, σ20 (%) 24.65 30.27 Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004)
Default point D1, D2 (% of ﬁrm value) 32.47 43.97 Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004), Leland (2004)
Asset mean: drift β1, β2 0.77 0.3 Calibrated to match historical default probabilities
Vol. of mean Firm 1 σµ11, σ
µ
12 0.2 0.25 Calibrated to match historical default probabilities
Vol. of mean Firm 2 σµ21, σ
µ
22 0.5 0.2 Calibrated to match historical default probabilities
Asset vol.: mean reversion α1, α2 0.74 0.8 Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004)
Asset vol.: long-run mean θ1, θ2 (%) 4.24 4.9 Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004)
Vol. of vol. Firm 1 σσ11, σ
σ
12 0.025 0.03 Calibrated to match historical default probabilities
Vol. of vol. Firm 2 σσ21, σ
σ
22 0.03 0.05 Calibrated to match historical default probabilities
Risk-free rate (%) 5 5 Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004)
Initial equity premium (%) 6 8.5 Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004)
Payout ratio (%) 2 2 Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004)
Firm values: Correlation ρV 0.1 Calibrated to match historical default probabilities
Means: Correlation ρµ 0.1 Calibrated to match historical default probabilities
Volatilities: Correlation ρσ 0.2 Calibrated to match historical default probabilities
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Matlab code for the Monte Carlo simulation
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%% BENCHMARK CALIBRATION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Parameters for the Monte Carlo simulation:
T=10;           % the time to maturity
Nsim=1000000;   % the number of simulations for each step considered
N=100;          % the number of steps considered
h=T/N;          % the step size (dt)
l=(0:h:T);      % the vector [0 1h 2h 3h ... Nh] to be used to rescale the x-axis for 
plotting
% The two brownian motions driving the means of the firms' values are
% correlated and consequently we make draws from a multivariate normal:
mumu=[0 0];
varmu=[1 0.1; 0.1 1];
r2=mvnrnd(mumu,varmu,Nsim);
epsZ1=r2(:,1)';
epsZ2=r2(:,2)';
% The two brownian motions driving the volatilities of the firms' values are
% correlated and consequently we make draws from a multivariate normal:
musigma=[0 0];
varsigma=[1 0.2; 0.2 1];
r1=mvnrnd(musigma,varsigma,Nsim);
epsW1=r1(:,1)';
epsW2=r1(:,2)';
% The two brownian motions driving the values of the firms are correlated
% and consequently we make draws from a multivariate normal:
muV=[0 0];
varV=[1 0.1; 0.1 1];
r3=mvnrnd(muV,varV,Nsim);
epsB1=r3(:,1)';
epsB2=r3(:,2)';
% Parameters from Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2004) and Leland (2004):
V1=100;         % the initial value of firm 1
V2=100;         % the initial value of firm 2
D1=43.29*0.75;  % the initial value of debt in firm 1 times the default boundary
D2=58.63*0.75;  % the initial value of debt in firm 2 times the default boundary
mu1=0.09;       % the initial value for the drift of firm 1
mu2=0.115;      % the initial value for the drift of firm 2
vol1=0.2465;    % the initial value for the volatility of firm 1
vol2=0.3027;    % the initial value for the volatility of firm 2
mvol1=0.0424;   % the long run volatility of firm 1
mvol2=0.049;    % the long run volatility of firm 2
kvol1=0.74;     % the mean reversion coefficient of firm 1
kvol2=0.8;      % the mean reversion coefficient of firm 2
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% Calibrated parameters to fit historical default probabilities:
kmu11=0.2;      % the volatility of the mean 11
kmu12=0.25;     % the volatility of the mean 12
kmu21=0.5;      % the volatility of the mean 21
kmu22=0.2;      % the volatility of the mean 22
kvol11=0.025;   % the volatility of the volatility 11
kvol12=0.03;    % the volatility of the volatility 12
kvol21=0.03;    % the volatility of the volatility 21
kvol22=0.05;    % the volatility of the volatility 22
b1=0.77;        % the drift of the mean for firm 1
b2=0.3;         % the drift of the mean for firm 2
% The Monte Carlo simulation:
jointPD=zeros(N,1);     % make a vector to store the joint probability of default   
probdef1=zeros(N,1);    % make a vector to store the probability of default Firm 1
probdef2=zeros(N,1);    % make a vector to store the probability of default Firm 2
for j=1:N             
    t=h*j;              
    sumjointprobab=0;
    sumprob1=0;
    sumprob2=0;
    for i=1:Nsim       
        
% Generate the time-varying and correlated means:
 mu11=mu1+b1*mu1*t+mu1*(kmu11*sqrt(t)*epsZ1(i)+kmu12*sqrt(t)*epsZ2(i));
 mu21=mu2+b2*mu2*t+mu2*(kmu21*sqrt(t)*epsZ1(i)+kmu22*sqrt(t)*epsZ2(i));
            
% Generate the time-varying and correlated volatilities:
 vol11=vol1+(kvol1*(mvol1-vol1))*t+sqrt(vol1)*(kvol11*sqrt(t)*epsW1(i)+kvol12*sqrt(t)
*epsW2(i));
 vol21=vol2+(kvol2*(mvol2-vol2))*t+sqrt(vol2)*(kvol21*sqrt(t)*epsW1(i)+kvol22*sqrt(t)
*epsW2(i));
            
% Generate the time-varying and correlated firm values:
 V11=V1+mu11*V1*t+V1*vol11*sqrt(t)*epsB1(i);
 V21=V2+mu21*V2*t+V2*vol21*sqrt(t)*epsB2(i);
            
% Count each time firm 1 default:
            
if V11<D1
    sumprob1=sumprob1+1;    
end
            
% Count each time firm 2 default:
            
if V21<D2
    sumprob2=sumprob2+1;
end
            
% Count each time both firms defaults:
            
if V11<D1 
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if V21<D2
    sumjointprobab=sumjointprobab+1;
end
end
end
% the probability of default for firm 1:
 probdef1(j,1)=sumprob1/Nsim;   
    
% the probability of default for firm 2:
 probdef2(j,1)=sumprob2/Nsim;   
    
% the probability of joint default:
 jointPD(j,1)=sumjointprobab/Nsim;
end
% Adjust the length of the vectors to be consistent with the x-axis:
jointPD;
jointPD=[zeros(1,1);jointPD]; 
probdef1;
probdef1=[zeros(1,1);probdef1];
probdef2;
probdef2=[zeros(1,1);probdef2];
% Make the figure of joint default probability as a function of time to maturity:
figure(1)
plot(l,jointPD,'-k','LineWidth',4);
xlabel('Time to maturity');
ylabel('Joint probability of default');
hleg1 = legend('Benchmark calibration');
grid on
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